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Abstract. An auction is a simple way of selling and buying goods. Modern auc-
tion protocols often rely on complex cryptographic operations to ensure manifold
security properties such as bidder-anonymity or bid-privacy, non-repudiation, fair-
ness or public verifiability of the result. This makes them difficult to understand
for users who are not experts in cryptography. We propose two physical auction
protocols inspired by Sako’s cryptographic auction protocol. In contrast to Sako’s
protocol, they do not rely on cryptographic operations, but on physical properties
of the manipulated mechanical objects to ensure the desired security properties.
The first protocol only uses standard office material, whereas the second uses a
special wooden box. We validate the security of our solutions using ProVerif.
1 Introduction
Auctions provide sellers and buyers with a way to exchange goods for a mutually ac-
ceptable price. Unlike a marketplace, where the sellers compete with each other, auc-
tions are a seller’s market where buyers bid against each other over the goods for sale.
Because of the competitive nature of the process, often an auctioneer serves as a trusted
third party to mediate the process. However, in many cases (for example on eBay) the
auctioneer charges a percentage of the selling price as his fee. Hence he has a financial
interest in the auction, which may compromise his neutrality.
Auction protocols typically rely on assorted cryptographic primitives and/or trusted
parties to simultaneously achieve seemingly contrary security goals like privacy and
verifiability. Examples include signatures of knowledge and zero-knowledge proofs [1],
coin-extractability, range proofs and proofs of knowledge [2], hash chains [3], and
proxy-oblivious transfers and secure evaluation functions [4]. Sako’s protocol [5], ex-
plained in detail in Section 2, applies public-key encryption in a clever way to imple-
ment a verifiable sealed-bid auction. Although it is fully verifiable, the bidders need
to trust the auctioneers for privacy of the losing bids. Brandt’s protocol [6] goes even
further: with the help of an ad hoc cryptographic primitive, Brandt claims to achieve
full privacy for all bidders, i.e. only the winner and the seller learn who the winner
is. However, the reliance on cryptographic primitives has its downside: cryptographic
primitives are complex, and their use requires great care not to introduce subtle weak-
nesses, as recent analysis of Brandt’s protocol shows [7].
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Moreover, as these protocols rely on complex cryptography, they are difficult to
understand for a non-expert. This is particularly intriguing when it comes to verifia-
bility – anyone lacking cryptographic expertise cannot ascertain for themselves that
the verification procedure is indeed correct, and is thus forced to trust the judgment of
cryptographic experts. This view underlies the German Constitutional Court’s decision
on electronic voting machines: “the use of electronic voting machines requires that the
essential steps of the voting and of the determination of the result can be examined by
the citizen reliably and without any specialist knowledge of the subject” [8]. Chaum [9]
argued along the same line in 2004 that all the ingeniously designed verifiable voting
protocols that had been put forward in literature did little to empower actual voters to
verify elections. To address this issue, he proposed a voting protocol using visual cryp-
tography: the ballot was distributed over two layers, that on top of each other showed the
voter’s choice. One layer was destroyed, leaving the voter with a layer full of random
dots from which no choice can be inferred. However, anyone can verify that the system
accurately recorded this layer – without any cryptographic expertise. In the same spirit,
we propose in this paper two auction protocols that only rely on physical manipulations
to enable non-experts to understand the protocol and its verification procedure.
Apart from Chaum’s “true voter-verifiable” voting protocol [9], the power of (partly)
physical protocols have also been studied for other applications. Stajano and Ander-
son [10] proposed a partly physical auction protocol using anonymous broadcast (e.g.
small radio transmitters), which however still uses some cryptography (e.g. one-way
functions and a Diffie-Hellman key exchange). More generally, Moran and Naor showed
that many cryptographic protocols can be implemented using tamper-evident seals [11].
They also analyzed a polling protocol based on physical envelopes [12]. Moreover, in
the context of game theory, Izmalkov, Lepinski and Micali [13] showed that a class of
games (normal-form mechanisms) can be implemented using envelopes, ballot boxes,
and a verifiable mediator in a privacy-preserving way. Fagin, Naor and Winkler [14] de-
scribed various physical methods of comparing two secret values. Finally, Schneier [15]
proposed a cypher based on a pack of cards.
Contributions. We start by recalling Sako’s auction protocol [5] in §2. Inspired
by this protocol, we propose a first physical implementation called Envelopako5 in §3.
This variant does not require cryptography nor trusted parties, yet retains the verifia-
bility, privacy, authentication and fairness properties of Sako’s protocol. Based on the
definitions by Dreier et al. [16, 17] we also provide a formal analysis of these security
properties in ProVerif [18], modeling their physical properties using a special equational
theory. Although ensuring privacy for the losing bidders, both the Sako protocol and the
Envelopako variant publicly reveal the winner. Our final contribution, Woodako6, is de-
scribed in §4: a physical auction protocol that offers stronger privacy i.e., the winner is
not publicly revealed, yet the result remains verifiable for losing bidders (similar to the
protocol by Brandt [6]). In this protocol, physical properties take the place of cryptog-
raphy and the trusted auctioneer. We build a concrete prototype, and formally verify the
security properties with the help of ProVerif. Finally, we conclude in §5.
5 Envelope version of Sako’s protocol.
6 Wooden box based implementation of Sako’s protocol.
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2 Protocol by Sako
Sako [5] proposed a protocol for sealed-bid first-price auctions which hides the bids
of losing bidders and ensures verifiability. The paper provides a high-level description
using a generic cryptographic primitive that ensures certain properties (e.g. ciphertext
indistinguishability). Sako also proposes two instantiations using specific cryptographic
primitives: the first one uses Elgamal [19] encryption, and the second one employs a
probabilistic version of RSA [20].
2.1 Informal Description
Informally, the protocol works as follows:
1. The authorities select a list of allowed bids p1, . . . , pm and a public constant c.
2. For each allowed bid pi, the authorities set up encryption and decryption algorithms
Epi and Dpi (in both implementations simply a public-private key pair). The en-
cryption scheme must provide an indistinguishability property. The authorities pub-
lish the encryption algorithms (or public keys in the implementation) and the list of
allowed bids on a bulletin board (a public append-only broadcast channel).
3. To bid for price pi, a bidder encrypts the public constant c using Epi , signs it and
publishes the bid Cj = Epi(c) together with the signature on the bulletin board.
4. After the bidding phase is over, the authorities check the signatures and start de-
crypting all bids with the highest possible price t = pm. If Dt(Cj) = c, then bid j
was a bid for price t. If all decryptions fail, the authorities decrease t and try again.
Each time a decryption is done, they publish a proof of correct decryption to enable
verifiability. This can be a zero-knowledge proof, or it might be achieved by simply
publishing the secret key.
5. To verify the outcome, anybody can verify the signatures, and check the proofs of
correct decryption.
In the rest of the this section we consider the implementation based on public and private
key pairs as a concretization of the general encryption/decryption algorithms, however
we abstract away of the precise encryption scheme. Note that dishonest authorities can
break privacy since they have access to all secret keys, but because of verifiability a
manipulation of the auction outcome can be detected.
2.2 Security Properties
We now argue informally that the protocol ensures Fairness, Non-Repudiation, Non-
Cancellation and Verifiability (as defined in [17, 16]). Moreover it ensures Privacy of
the losing bidders (“Strong Bidding-Price Secrecy” in terms of [17]) if the authorities
are trusted. To formally verify these properties we use ProVerif [18], which allows us to
prove that all the properties hold. Due to the space limitations we only give the informal
analysis here, the formal analysis is available in the extended version of the paper [21].
Non-Cancellation and Non-Repudiation [17]. The bids are signed and published
on the append-only bulletin board. Hence a bidder cannot deny that he made his bid,
and the submitted bids cannot be altered or otherwise canceled.
Fairness. We consider the two aspects defined in [17]:
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Fig. 1: The Envelopako protocol
– Highest-Price-Wins: This property is to ensure that an attacker cannot win the auc-
tion at a price below the actual highest bid. In this protocol, the authorities start
by decrypting using the decryption algorithm corresponding to the highest possible
price (if not, this can be detected, see Verifiability), hence they will identify the
highest bid. Similarly, because of the signatures on the bids and the properties of
the bulletin board, the bids cannot be modified, deleted or replaced.
– Weak-Non-Interference: This property is to ensure that no information about the
bidders’ bids is leaked before the bidding phase ends – otherwise they might em-
ploy unfair strategies based on that information. In this protocol the bids leak no
other information apart from the identity of the bidders (revealed by the signature)
because of the indistinguishability property of the encryption scheme.
Verifiability. Everybody can check the signatures of the bids on the bulletin board,
ensuring that all bids originated from eligible bidders and were not modified. Similarly,
all participants can use the proofs of correct decryption to check whether the authorities
opened the bids correctly, hence ensuring the correctness of the outcome computation.
Privacy. The authorities have all private keys and can hence open all bids, breaking
privacy. If the authorities are trusted, they will discard all unused keys, thereby prevent-
ing anyone from opening the losing bids and breaking the privacy of losing bidders.
Given the indistinguishability property of the encryption scheme, this ensures secrecy
of the losing bids.
3 The “Envelopako” Protocol
This protocol is a practical implementation of Sako’s protocol using office material.
3.1 Description
In the Envelopako protocol each bidder has one sheet of paper per price (the bidding
form) and as many envelopes with a transparent window (see Fig. 1). To bid for his
chosen price, the bidder marks “Yes” on the bidding form corresponding to his price,
and “No” on all other forms. All forms are inserted into the envelopes, and signed on
the outside by the bidder. The envelopes are sealed and shown to all other bidders so
that they can check the signatures. For m possible prices pm > pm−1 > . . . > p1, the
bid thus consists of m envelopes. The window allows to see the price without opening
the envelope, yet the envelope hides whether the bidder chose “Yes” or “No”.
Once all bidders have finished creating bids and shown their signatures, the bid-
ders randomly exchange their bids (i.e. the sets of m envelopes) and jointly open the
envelopes, starting with the highest possible price. If one of the envelopes contains a
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“Yes”, the bidders identified a bid for this (highest) price, and hence a winner. The sig-
nature on the outside then allows for the identification of the winner. If all envelopes
contain “No”, the bidders open the envelopes for the second price, and so on. Note also
that the opening happens in presence of all bidders and the seller to ensure that protocol
is followed. To fully ensure verifiability, the protocol must also ensure that only eligi-
ble bidders can bid. This is achieved through the verification of the signatures on the
envelopes by the seller and bidders when bids are submitted.
3.2 Security Properties
The Envelopako protocol relies on the physical properties of the envelopes: Nobody
can see from the outside the contents of a envelope, in particular whether the bidder
marked “Yes” or “No” for a given price, and opening the envelopes breaks the seal.
Hence the bids are private, and by opening the envelopes one by one in decreasing
order only the winning bid(s) is/are revealed. The protocol offers verifiability similar to
Sako’s protocol as well as non-cancellation and non-repudiation due to the signatures
and the mixing of the envelopes: All participants are in the same room, can check the
signatures, and whether an envelope contained a “Yes” or “No”. It ensures fairness
since no premature information is leaked (Weak Non-Interference) and due to the joint
bid opening no cheating is possible (Highest Price Wins).
Obviously a malicious bidder can open an envelope of his choice to read its contents
– but this is actually similar to Sako’s protocol, where dishonest authorities can break
privacy. The difference is that in Envelopako such a behavior will be detected by the
other bidders, since they are in the same room and the envelope is damaged. An exten-
sion to improve privacy could be to put the signed envelopes into slightly bigger and
indistinguishable envelopes after the signature has been verified by the other parties.
These envelopes can be posted into a ballot box (one per possible price) to break the
link between a bidder and his bid. Hence a malicious bidder can only break the privacy
of a random bid, but not necessary of the one he is interested in. A detailed discussion
of other possible (side-channel) attacks is available in the extended version [21].
In our formal analysis [21] we model the physical properties of the envelopes us-
ing a special equational theory in ProVerif, which allows to employ the same verifi-
cation steps as for Sako’s protocol. ProVerif concludes that the protocol ensures Non-
Repudiation, Non-Cancellation, Weak Non-Interference, Highest Price Wins and Veri-
fiability. When verifying Privacy, ProVerif finds the obvious attacks of opening the en-
velopes discussed above, but if we assume honest bidders, Privacy can also be proven.
3.3 A distributed variant
The Envelopako protocol requires all participants to be in the same room during the
bid opening, yet we can build a distributed protocol with a few minor modifications,
and assuming a semi-trusted seller. Firstly each bidder also signs on the bidding form.
To prevent issues resulting from multiple instances run in parallel, the bidders should
also add an auction identifier to the form to link their bid to a specific auction. After
preparing the envelopes, each bidder then sends (e.g. by postal mail) his envelopes to
the seller, who collects all envelopes. The seller then determines the winner using the
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same technique as above.7 To prove to the bidders that his result is correct, he sends
them photocopies of all bidding forms from the envelopes he opened. Moreover, he
returns the unopened envelopes to the bidders, in order to prove that he did not violate
privacy. This allows all bidders to verify the correctness of the outcome, and even their
privacy. In this variant the seller is semi-trusted in the sense that he can misbehave and
violate some properties of the protocol, e.g. privacy by opening all envelopes. However
his behavior is completely verifiable, i.e. any misbehavior is detectable.
4 The “Woodako” Protocol
To improve the privacy of the Envelopako protocol, we developed Woodako, which
relies on a special wooden box. Our prototype is designed for 3 bidders and 5 possible
prices, but such a box can be built for other numbers n,m of bidders and prices. Fig. 2a
shows all components of the box. The Woodako auction system uses: (1) five black
marbles per bidder, each size represents one price; (2) six layers (L0 – L5 ): layers L0
and L1 are made of transparent plexiglass and have no holes. The other layers are
made of wood and contain four holes per column8, which correspond to the size of
the marbles: the holes in L2 are only big enough for the smallest marbles, the holes
in L3 for the second-smallest etc.; (3) three top layers T1 , T2 , T3 – each layer is
associated with a bidder; (4) two inclined layers: these are placed below the layers, near
the bottom of the box; (5) locks and keys: each bidder and the seller has a set of locks
and keys; (6) one front side made of wood that closes the box and contains holes to
insert the extremities of the layers. These extremities will stick out and so constitute a
place where the parties can put locks. The locks are used to ensure security properties
regarding that layer, for example that it cannot be removed unless everybody agrees.
4.1 Description
The wooden box carries out the important steps of the auction in a secure way through
its physical properties. The box (see Fig. 2b) is composed of three columns and seven
horizontal plus two inclined layers. Each column (the left, middle and right part of the
box) corresponds to one bidder. The top layers T1 , T2 and T3 are used to achieve
confidentiality of the bid of each bidder, as the marbles (corresponding to the bids)
are inserted underneath. The transparent layer L0 is used to lock the bids, once they
are made, to achieve non-repudiation and non-cancellation. The five lower horizontal
layers L1 – L5 are used to determine the winning price in a private way. Finally, the
two inclined layers are intended to make it impossible to know from which column a
marble fell by guiding all of them to the same spot in the bottom left part of the box.
7 There is a potential attack when a bidder and the seller collude: the seller can open all bids
from the other bidders until he identifies the highest bid, and then inform the colluding bidder
to submit a bid for the same price in order to provoke a tie. Note that this can only be used
to provoke a tie, as submitting a higher bid afterwards results in two envelopes for different
prices containing “Yes” with broken seals, which can be detected. Moreover, it can be ad-
dressed by opening the envelopes for the same price one after the other, and declaring the first
“Yes” as the winner. No other envelope is opened, and hence any situation with two envelopes
containing “Yes” with broken seals (even for the same price, as in the above attack) identifies
a misbehavior of the seller.
8 The choice of four holes per column is arbitrary, we simply used multiple holes to improve
practicality.
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(a) The Woodako prototype. (b) Inside our Woodako prototype,
where layers L1 and L2 are re-
moved.
Fig. 2: Our prototype
The main idea is the following: Each bidder places his bid, represented by a marble
of a certain size, in the top part of the box. We use five different sizes, the smallest
one representing the highest possible price, and the biggest one representing the lowest
possible price. In the bidding phase, all marbles are inserted into the box onto solid
layer L1 . In the opening phase, layer L1 is removed. Below there is layer L2 with
holes big enough to only let the smallest marbles pass through. Below L2 , there is L3
with bigger holes (the size of the next biggest marble), etc. If a bidder inputs the smallest
marble (the highest possible price), it will fall through all layers once the solid layer is
removed, hence revealing the winning price – but not the winning bidder, thanks to the
inclined layers. If nobody inserted the smallest marble, no marble will fall through and
the participants can remove the next layer to check for the second highest price, etc.
All layers L0 – L5 are equipped with four locks, one for each of the three bidders,
plus one for the seller. This ensures that a layer can only be removed if all parties agree
to do so. Similarly, the removable front side of the box is attached using four locks in
the four corners (cf. Fig. 3a), one for each bidder plus one for the seller. This allows the
parties to inspect the interior of the box before starting the protocol.
The topmost layer consists of three independent parts T1 , T2 and T3 that each
bidder can use to secure his bid (i.e. his marble inside the box, cf. Fig. 3a). Once all bids
are inserted, the transparent layer L0 is inserted just below and locked by all parties to
ensure non-cancellation (cf. Fig. 2b). Once the winning price is determined, the bidders
can open their column by removing their lock on Ti and check through the transparent
layer if their part of the box is empty or not, i.e. if they won or not (cf. Fig. 3b). Similarly
the seller can remove the two inclined layers at the bottom to check if a marble is present
inside a column or not (cf. Fig. 3d). The first solid layer L1 of the price determination
part is transparent to allow the participants to check at the start of the protocol if each
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(a) The Woodako box after the bid
of bidder number two.
(b) Bidder verifiability (i.e. view from
top).
(c) The Woodako box after two prices
have been tested.
(d) Seller verifiability (i.e. view from
bottom).
Fig. 3: The Woodako box: bidding, determining the winner, and verification
bidder inserted exactly one marble. Note also that all participants are always in presence
of the box to be able to detect misbehavior.
The protocol is divided into 4 phases:
1) Initialization: Each participant can check the material and look the inside of the
box as in Fig. 2b to convince himself of the correct design of the machine. The seller
gives black marbles of different sizes to each bidder. The smallest marble corresponds
to the biggest price, the biggest marble represents the lowest price. Moreover the seller
and each bidder have a set of padlocks and keys (as in Fig. 3a). Once all bidders have
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checked the box and received their material, the seller closes the box with the front
side. The seller and each bidder put a padlock on the box (on each corner of Fig. 3c,
marked with 1, 2, 3, and S). The seller places the layers L1 – L5 in the box, but neither
the individual top layers T1 , T2 and T3 nor the transparent layer L0 . The seller also
places the two inclined layers in the bottom of the box. Finally, he puts one lock on each
layer on the middle column, all four locks on the inclined layers, and assigns a column
to each bidder.
2) Bidding Phase: Each bidder selects a marble corresponding to the price he wants
to bid and puts it in his column without showing the marble to the other parties. He then
closes his column using his top layer Ti and secures it using one of his locks. He
also puts locks on the five layers L1 – L5 below. In Fig. 3a you can see the box after
bidder number 2 assigned to the middle column has made his bid. Once all bids are
made and all locks in place, the seller introduces the transparent plexiglass layer L0 ,
i.e. in the hole between the individual top layers and the first full layer L1 . Finally each
participant puts a lock on plexiglass layer L0 .
3) Opening Phase: The seller and all bidders verify that each bidder inserted ex-
actly one marble by removing the inclined layers (to which the seller has the keys) and
looking through the holes of layers L2 – L5 and the plexiglass layer L1 from below9.
After the inclined layers have been reinstalled and locked by the seller, all participants
remove their lock on the layer L1 , and the seller removes it. If somebody chose to bid
the highest possible price, i.e. inserted the smallest possible marble, it will now fall
down through all the holes (since all lower layers have bigger holes) and all participants
know the winning price, yet not the winner. If no marble falls down, they repeat this
process with the next layer below corresponding to the next price. In Fig. 3c, we see the
back of the box once the two first prices have been tested. The inclined layers are there
to hide from which column the marble fell, as all marbles will end up in the bottom left
part independently of where they came from (cf. Fig. 2b).
4) Verification Phase: Once a marble has fallen down, each bidder can open his
lock on his top layer Ti and check if his marble is still inside. In Fig, 3b, bidder number
two notes that his marble is still inside the box, so he did not win. Similarly the seller
can remove the two inclined layers and check for each column, whether there is still a
marble inside, hence determining the winner – the column with no marble. An example
is given in Fig. 3d: the left bidder won since his column is empty, and the two others
lost, as their marbles are still there (highlighted by the yellow circles).
Resolving ties: Note that in the case of a tie two or more marbles fall down at the
same time. Thus everybody knows that there is a tie, the seller can also identify the
tied parties, and the bidders know if they are tied or not. Moreover a tied party can
prove to anybody that he is tied by opening his top and showing that his compartment is
empty. To resolve the situation either an external tie-breaking mechanism can be used
(e.g. rolling a die), or the auction can simply be restarted. Using an external mechanism
implies revealing the identity of the tied parties or trusting the seller, since he is the only
one who knows who is tied. If privacy is the main concern and the seller is not to be
9 In our experiments it was sometimes necessary to incline the box slightly so that the marbles
stay in the same corner, similar to Fig. 3d
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trusted, the auction can simply be restarted and giving the bidders the chance to modify
their bids. Sako’s protocol (our inspiration) also reveals the identity of the tied parties.
4.2 Security Properties
We now argue how the properties defined in [16, 17] are achieved, as long as there is at
least one honest party following the protocol (i.e. one bidder or the seller). Note that we
also successfully verified all the properties using ProVerif. The box and its properties are
again modeled using a special equational theory, described in our extended version [21].
Non-cancellation and non-repudiation. Everybody can see in which column a
bidder inserted his marble. Due to the fact that the layer L0 is locked by all the partici-
pants, nobody can change his price during the execution of the protocol. Hence nobody
can cancel his bid. Similarly nobody can deny that it was his marble that fell down as
the seller and the concerned bidder can verify in which column a marble is still present.
Moreover the check at the beginning of the opening phase ensures due to the transparent
layer L1 that there is exactly one marble per bidder.
Fairness. We consider the two aspects defined in [17]: 1) Highest-Price-Wins: By
the design of the box and the holes of different size in layers L2 – L5 , the highest price
offered by a bidder which is represented by the smallest marble is the first marble to
fall down. No bidder can make a larger marble drop before a smaller one. 2) Weak-Non-
Interference: For a given set of bidders no information about the bids is leaked until the
end of the bidding phase, since each bidder can choose his marble privately and drop it
into the box in such a way that nobody can identify its size.
Privacy. The winner is only known to the seller and himself, but everybody knows
the winning price. The inclined layers prevent anybody else from determining the win-
ner by observing from which column the marble fell10. Once a marble has dropped, the
winner can check if his column is empty by unlocking his top layer Ti and looking
inside. The seller can also determine the winner by removing the inclined layers and
checking which column is empty as shown in Fig. 3d. Since the remaining marbles are
too big to fall through the holes, the seller can only see if there is a marble, but will
be unable to determine its size, as all marbles have the same color. This preserves the
secrecy of the losing bids. The losing bidders can also open their top layers Ti and
verify if their marbles are still inside as shown in Fig. 3b. This leaks no information
about the winner, yet they know the price from the moment when the marble falls as
each layer corresponds to a price. Hence we have two cases: If the seller is honest, the
winner stays anonymous, and only the winning price is revealed. If however the seller
is corrupted, he can reveal the winner, and we only have secrecy of the losing bids.
Verifiability. The registration is done at the beginning of the protocol by the seller,
and all participants can check if only the registered bidders participate by inserting
10 Note that with two layers as shown in Fig. 2b there is a side-channel attack: If the marble falls
down in the rightmost column, one can hear the sound of a falling marble only once, whereas
in the case of the other two columns the marble falls down twice. However there are simple
solutions: one can extend both layers further to the right so that the marbles fall down twice
independently of their original column, or one can use something similar to a “bean machine”,
i.e. several rows of pins, arranged so that the falling marble hits a pin in each row. The idea is
that the marble has a 50% chance of falling down on either side of the pin, hence arrives at a
random location on the bottom.
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a marble into the box. Hence the protocol ensures registration verifiability. Outcome
verifiability is achieved by the fact that each participant can check the box and the
mechanism at the beginning of the protocol, and that each bidder can check at the end
whether he lost or won by opening his top layer Ti . The seller can also verify the
outcome by opening the bottom of the box.
5 Conclusion
Current auction protocols rely on complex cryptographic operations. However, we ar-
gued that the verifiability of an auction should not depend on cryptographic exper-
tise – without understanding, there is no meaningful verifiability. With that in mind,
we adapted a suitable cryptographic auction protocol to achieve its security properties
without cryptography. We began by analyzing Sako’s protocol for Non-Cancellation,
Non-Repudiation, Fairness, Verifiability and Privacy informally, and formally using the
ProVerif tool. As the protocol mostly passed our automated scrutiny (for privacy, the
auctioneers have to be trusted), we took this protocol as a base for the development of
our two protocols.
We then proposed the Envelopako protocol, an auction protocol inspired by Sako’s
protocol where each bidder marks on a separate piece of paper for each possible price
if they want to bid this price or not. These bidding forms are then inserted into signed
envelopes, which are opened in descending order to determine the winner in a private
way. We modeled the physical properties of the envelopes using an equational theory
in ProVerif, which allows to apply the exact same analysis as for the cryptographic
protocol. The analysis successfully proved Non-Repudiation, Non-Cancellation, Weak
Non-Interference, Verifiability, and Highest Price Wins. For privacy, an issue was auto-
matically found: dishonest participants may open an envelope to see the corresponding
bidding form. A mitigation is that such actions are readily detectable by all, as any han-
dling of the envelopes occurs in public view. We also discussed a distributed variant
of this protocol with a semi-trusted seller, i.e. the protocol does not prevent him from
misbehaving, but any misbehavior can be detected.
To improve privacy, we introduced the Woodako protocol. This protocol is again
inspired by Sako’s protocol, and again replaces cryptography and trusted parties by
physical properties. Bids are represented by marbles, where smaller marbles denote
higher bids. Bidders place the marble corresponding to their bid in their designated col-
umn in a (mechanical) contraption. Then, the first layer below all columns is removed,
leaving a new layer with holes the size of the smallest marble. If at least one marble
falls through, there is a winner, otherwise this layer is removed and the next layer with
larger holes is now the base layer. We argued that Woodako achieves Non-Repudiation,
Non-Cancellation, Weak Non-Interference, Verifiability, and Highest Price Wins. More-
over, this argumentation did not require any expert knowledge to understand, nor did
it hinge on correct behavior by trusted parties. As the seller knows the winning bid-
der, a dishonest seller can reveal the winner. As such, the protocol ensures Privacy for
all bidders including anonymity of the winner in case of an honest seller, and simple
privacy for losing bidders in case of a dishonest seller. This was again confirmed by a
formal analysis in ProVerif. As future work we look to improve the practicality of our
protocols, as they do not scale well for higher numbers of bidders or possible prices.
Moreover, we would like to examine whether our protocols can be adapted for second-
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price auctions, and how we can improve the handling of ties. For this we are looking
into other cryptographic protocols as sources of inspiration.
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